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MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS: DOES VIRGINIA'S NEW LAW
CORRESPOND WITH THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE AVERAGE
DEPOSITOR?
There are literally thousands of joint savings and checking accounts
throughout Virginia in which the bank signature card provides that either
party during their joint lives or the survivor may withdraw funds without
limit from the account.1 The Virginia Supreme Court forthrightly recog-
nized the problems of such accounts in the landmark case of King v.
Merryman, stating, "For more than half a century, the courts of this
country have struggled to discover whether a joing deposit bank account
with an extended right of survivorship ... is a gift, a trust, a contract, or
joint tenancy, or a testamentary disposition."2 In an attempt to bring or-
der to this area confused by judicial decisions, public misconceptions$ and
a muddle of statutory provisions, the 1979 Virginia General Assembly en-
acted the Multiple Party Accounts Act which became effective on July 1,
1980.
4
The movement to rectify the uncertainty in the area of multiple-party
accounts5 in Virginia was instituted by the Virginia Bar Association. In
1975 the Bar conducted a study of the entire area of multiple-party ac-
counts and produced a report relating Article Six of the Uniform Probate
1. Spies, Property, The Fifteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law 1969-70, 56 VA. L. REv.
1546 (1970).
2. 196 Va. 844, 849, 86 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1955).
3. General conversation as well as case law demonstrates that the public is not aware of
the legal significance of joint accounts as they pertain to rights between named parties dur-
ing their lifetime and to survivorship rights. Comment, Virginia Law on Joint Bank Ac-
counts, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 195, 198-99 (1963).
In Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 621, 125 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1962), the bank official
first suggested that the funds in the joint account were legally the property of the named
party survivor and not the decedent's estate. However, the court, following case precedent,
denied the survivor's right to the funds, holding there was insufficient evidence of donative
intent.
4. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 407, at 596. The Act amended and reenacted §§ 6.1-207 and -208.5 of
the Code of Virginia concerning shares of minors in a credit union and federal credit unions
respectively. The Act also added §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 which deal with multiple-party ac-
counts in financial institutions. Sections 6.1-72, -73, -77, -195.23, -195.26, -195.30 and -208.2
of the Code of Virginia were repealed, effective July 1, 1980.
5. As used in this article, multiple-party accounts refers to joint accounts, payable on
death (P.O.D.) accounts and Totten trust accounts as defined in the UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE § 6-101(5) [hereinafter cited as UPC].
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Code (UPC) to Virginia law.6 Its effort to eliminate statutory omissions
and conflicts and bring the law closer to public expectations culminated
on July 21, 1978 with the formation of a Special Drafting Committee. The
charge of the committee was "to draft a comprehensive multiple-party
accounts bill for introduction into the 1979 session of the General Assem-
bly." 1 The committee's proposal, based upon Article Six of the UPC, was
introduced into and approved by the 1979 General Assembly.8
In the 1980 session of the General Assembly, an amendment concerning
the effects of divorce on ownership between the parties named to a multi-
ple-party account was offered to section 6.1-125.4 of the Multiple-Party
Accounts Act.9
This article will present a brief overview of the case law and statutory
provisions antedating the new statute. Thereafter, the new statute and
the suggested 1980 amendment will be examined and evaluated from the
perspective of additions or changes to prior Virginia law and Chapter Six
of the UPC as well as from the perspective of the expectations of
depositors.
6. J. Rodney Johnson, Virginia Comments to Article VI, Uniform Probate Code (Dec. 1,
1975) (unpublished report for the Virginia Bar Association) (hereinafter Virginia
Comments].
7. Memorandum from the Multiple-Party Accounts Special Drafting Committee of the
Virginia Bar Association to Edward S. Graves, Chairman, Wills, Trusts & Estates Commit-
tee of the Virginia Bar Association (Oct. 6, 1978).
Other than Virginia Bar Association members, representatives of the Virginia Bankers
Association, the Virginia Savings and Loan League, and the Virginia Credit Union served on
the drafting committee. However, in spite of its significant impact upon the public, there
was no citizen representation on the committee.
8. S.B. No. 645 Va. General Assembly (1979) was offered January 10, 1979, by its patron
Sen. J. Harry Michael, Jr. The bill was approved March 26, 1979. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 407, at
597.
9. S.B. No. 388 Va. General Assembly (1980) was introduced February 15, 1980 by Sen. J.
Harry Michael, Jr. The amendment proposes:
That § 6.1-125.4 of the Code of Virginia [be] amended and reenacted as follows:
§ 6.1-125.4. Effect of Divorce. - Upon the entry of a decree of divorce, either a
mensa et thoro or a vinculo matrimonii, all rights of either consort in any multiple-
party account (i) then existing between them, or (ii) Terminated by either of them in
contemplation of divorce including the right of survivorship, shall be extinguished;
and any joint account (i) then existing between the consorts or (ii) terminated by
either of them in contemplation of divorce shall thereupon be converted into [equal
shares], retroactive to (i) the date when the grounds for the divorce came into exis-
tence, (ii) the date the account was terminated in contemplation of divorce, or (iii)
the date the parties began living separate and apart, as may be ordered by the court
in order to do equity between the parties.
The Senate Courts of Justice Committee voted to carry over S.B. No. 388 for further
study.
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I. A REVIEW OF VIRGINIA'S STATUTORY AND CASE LAW PRIOR TO JULY 1,
1980
A. A Discussion of Case Law
Beginning in 1917 with Deal's Administrator v. Merchant's and
Mechanic's Savings Bank,10 the common thread running through the
thirteen Virginia cases dealing with multiple-party accounts"' is that the
intention of the depositor is the controlling factor.1 2 These cases deal with
the right of survivorship in joint accounts. There is no case law in Vir-
ginia concerning the rights to such accounts while both parties are alive. s
The Virginia Supreme Court established that, although the form of the
joint account provides for survivorship, it is presumed that such deposits
by a person in the name of himself and another, not his spouse," are
made merely for the convenience of the depositor. 5 Thus, no incident of
survivorship necessarily attaches. The court's decisions indicated, how-
ever, that the survivor could rebut this presumption of convenience where
in the language of the signature card itself there was a definite and unam-
biguous expression of an intention that the incidents of survivorship
10. 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917). Although the court in Deal's explicitly relied on the
contract theory, the opinion also stated that the deposit was made by the decedent with the
manifest intention that the balance would go to the survivor. Id. at 298, 91 S.E. at 135.
11. Thurston v. Maggard, - Va. -, 263 S.E.2d 64 (1980); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris,
220 Va. 336, 257 S.E.2d 867 (1979); Robbins v. Grimes, 211 Va. 97, 175 S.E.2d 246 (1970);
Campbell v. Campbell, 211 Va. 31, 175 S.E.2d 243 (1970); Colley v. Cox, 209 Va. 811, 167
S.E.2d 317 (1969); Haynes v. Hurt, 209 Va. 447, 164 S.E.2d 671 (1968); Wilkinson v. Wither-
spoon, 206 Va. 297, 142 S.E.2d 478 (1965); Stevens v. Sparks, 205 Va. 128, 135 S.E.2d 140
(1964); Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Johnson v. McCarty, 202
Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960); Wrenn v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958); King v.
Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955); Deal's Adm'r v. Merchant's and Mechanic's
Say. Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917).
All the cases involve joint accounts in a financial institution with the exception of Vir-
ginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris which concerns a P.O.D. account.
12. 3A MICHS' JURMSPRUDENCE, Banks and Banking § 66 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
13. Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 10.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601) provides that "[w]hen a deposit has been made... under the names
of a husband and wife, payable to either, or payable to the survivor, such deposit ... upon
the death of either ... shall vest in the survivor."
15. 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 50, at 836 (1943) as cited in King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844 at 856,
86 S.E.2d 141 at 147 (1955).
By presumption of convenience, the court means that the one furnishing the funds for the
deposit merely wished his cotenant to act as an agent in obtaining funds from the joint
account for the depositor. J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.O.D. Bank Ac-
counts: Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 41, 43
(1973).
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should attach, 6 or where, in the absence of the signature card fully dis-
closing such an intention, extrinsic evidence demonstrated such an inten-
tion."7 These cases have been aptly described as long-form and short-form
cases, respectively.'8 The result in the long-form cases is said by the court
to be based on contract theory"9 while the outcome of the short-form case
turns on the intention of the depositor within a common-law gift theory.20
16. See, e.g., Thurston v. Maggard, - Va. -, 263 S.E.2d 64 (1980); Robbins v. Grimes, 211
Va. 97, 175 S.E.2d 246 (1970); Campbell v. Campbell, 211 Va. 31, 175 S.E.2d 243 (1970);
Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, 206 Va. 297, 142 S.E.2d 478 (1965).
The unambiguous language on the signature card so far as is pertinent read:
[Depositor's name] .... and [co-tenant's name] . . . as joint tenants with right of
survivorship . . . It is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by the
parties with you that any funds placed in or added to the account by any one of the
parties is and shall be conclusively intended to be a gift and delivery at that time of
such funds to the other signatory party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata
interest in the account....
Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, 206 Va. at 300, 142 S.E.2d at 480. In Thurston different but
equally unambiguous language provided in part: "'That all moneys, checks and other in-
struments for the payment of money ... deposited in this account ... will be our joint
property during our joint lives and upon the death of either of us the entire right, title and
interest therein shall vest absolutely in the survivor. Thurston v. Maggard, - Va. at
-, 263 S.E.2d at 65.
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
17. See, e.g., Stevens v. Sparks, 205 Va. 128, 135 S.E.2d 140 (1964); Quesenberry v. Funk,
203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Wrenn v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958);
King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955). Only in Stevens did the court find the
presumption of convenience rebutted. The signature card in these cases was
in the form of "A or B, and subject to the check of either of us or the sirvivor", "A or
B or survivor", "A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as te-
nants in common", or. . . "jointly, with right of survivorship and ... subject to the
check or receipt of either of them or the survivor ..
Johnson, supra note 15, at 42.
18. Id.
19. The contract theory of the long-form cases has been criticized since the crucial lan-
guage the court refers to in these cases, "shall be conclusively intended to be a gift," recog-
nizes the existence of a gift. Spies, supra note 1, at 1548-49 (1970). Furthermore, the prece-
dential value of these decisions is in doubt. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Poin. No. 403
(formerly UPL Opin. No. 45) summarized in 27 VA. BAR NEWs 22 (Aug. 1978) which con-
cludes that "furnishing a joint account signature card contract containing language estab-
lishing an inter vivos gift from one party of the account to the other constitute[s] the un-
authorized practice of law."
20. See Stevens v. Sparks, 205 Va. 128, 135 S.E.2d 140 (1964), a short-form case which
used the language A or B as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in
common. Relying on extrinsic evidence instead of basing its decision upon the language on
the signature card, the court upheld the survivorship rights of the nursemdid cotenant of
the decedent depositor. Cf. Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Wrenn
v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958); King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d
141 (1955), where the court refused to uphold survivorship rights in joint accounts because
[Vol. 14:851
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Two further distinctions appearing in Virginia case law demand atten-
tion as a background to Virginia's new Multiple-Party Accounts Statute.
Where there is a short-form account consisting of funds belonging to both
of the tenants, the Virginia Supreme Court has held no presumption of
convenience is applicable. The burden of proving the lack of intention of
survivorship falls on those claiming through the decedent.21 And, in
Johnson v. McCarty," the only case dealing with joint accounts between
husband and wife, the court held that the joint bank account became the
property of the surviving tenant by operation of law stating: "[t]he
method and procedure of setting up the Virginia bank account created a
joint estate with the express right of survivorship. Virginia Code, § 51-
21.' '2 Although the Johnson joint account was of the short form variety,24
the court did not discuss the presumption of convenience. It is unclear
whether this lack of discussion was due to the language found in other
cases that the presumption of convenience did not apply to husband and
wife accounts25 or whether it was due to a statute then in force providing
for vesting the balance of the funds in the surviving spouse.28 Neverthe-
less, clearly the courts did not apply the presumption of convenience to
husband and wife accounts.
Thus, the Virginia decisions were well settled that a bank account may
be so fixed between two persons during their lives that the survivor takes
extrinsic evidence strengthened the presumption of convenience.
In Colley v. Cox, 209 Va. 811, 167 S.E.2d 317 (1969), a short-form case, despite extrinsic
evidence of the depositor's intent that her son, the surviving cotenant, be entitled to the
balance of the fund, the court held that the preseumption did not come into play since no
survivorship account was created by oral "instructions to the bank... or contractual lan-
guage on the signature card." Thurston v. Maggard, - Va. at -, 263 S.E.2d at 66.
The pertinent part of the Colley account reads: "'Savings Joint Account [names] ....
Either one or both or the survivor to sign. The signature of either one to be sufficient for
withdrawal of all, or any part of the funds. .. ."' Colley v. Cox, 209 Va. at 813, 167 S.E.2d
at 318-19. For a discussion of this seemingly anamalous decision, see Johnson, supra note
15, at 45.
21. Haynes v. Hurt, 209 Va. 447, 164 S.E.2d 671 (1968). See Johnson, supra note 15, at
45.
22. 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960).
23. Id. at 56, 115 S.E.2d at 920.
24. The account in question read "to 'J. Roland Johnson or Sarah N. Johnson, joint
owners, payable to either or the survivor.'" Id. at 53, 115 S.E.2d at 918.
25. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601). The Johnson court made no reference to this statute. For further
discussion of the Johnson case, see Comment, Virginia Law on Bank Accounts, 20 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 195, 197-98 n.21 (1963).
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on the death of the other.2 7 However, whether or not the incident of sur-
vivorship attached to a joint account could "depend upon the terms of
the deposit, that is the contract made with the bank,. . . upon the inten-
tions of the depositors as disclosed by their declarations, oral or writ-
ten,"28 upon funds belonging to both named parties, or upon the relation-
ship of such parties. Subjective intent was a dominant theme in the
resolution of these joint account cases. Consequently, the results were not
predictable and the survivorship expectations of the depositors were
clearly frustrated.29
B. The Statutory Picture in Virginia
Although survivorship between joint tenants has been abolished by sec-
tion 55-20 of the Code of Virginia, another statute creates an exception to
this rule "when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument
that it was intended the part [of the estate] of the one dying should then
belong to the others. ' 30 These statutes have been held applicable to joint
deposit accounts.3 1
In addition, the Virginia General Assembly in the past dealt with mul-
tiple-party accounts in the Banking Act, 2 the Virginia Savings and Loan
Act 3 and the Industrial Loan Associations Act.34
Upon the death of the trustees, sections 6.1-207, 6.1-195.23, and 6.1-
73.1 of the Virginia Code governing Totten trusts" had three different
effects based not on the substance of the account, but upon which type of
financial institution the depositor happened to choose. Respectively,
27. King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 858, 86 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1955).
28. Id.
29. In a 1978 Virginia survey using a short-form signature card, 83.8% of approximately
700 respondents believed that survivorship would result if used by a husband and wife and
61.2% believed survivorship would attach if used by persons other than spouses. Report of
the Multiple-Party Deposit Accounts Committee of the Virginia Bar Association, Meeting of
September 18, 1978, at 2 (Sept. 19, 1978).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
31. See, e.g., Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960); King v. Merryman,
196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).
32. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-3 to -125 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
33. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-195.1 to -195.76 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
34. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-196 to -226 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
35. [Such a trust is] created by the deposit by one person of his own money in his own
name as a trustee for another and it is a tentative trust revocable at will until the
depositor dies ... and if the depositor dies before the beneificiary without revocation
... the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on
hand at the death of the depositor.
Johnson, supra note 15, at 46 n.37.
[Vol. 14:851
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these statutes resulted in: 1) a minor beneficiary being able immediately
to withdraw funds if the account was in a credit union, 2) a minor benefi-
ciary unable to withdraw funds without a guardian if the account was in a
savings and loan, and 3) uncertainty as to what withdrawal rights, if any,
a minor beneficiary had in bank deposits exceeding five thousand dollars.
These statutes dealt only with the rights of the beneficiaries of such ac-
counts. Protection of the Totten trust financial institution was not ad-
dressed anywhere in the Code.
In payable on death (P.O.D.) accounts, as with the minor beneficiaries
of the Totten trust accounts, different treatment occurred purely because
of the type of financial institution involved. In those accounts opened in a
bank, assuming the death of the depositors, while a bank had the power
to turn over the funds to a surviving minor immediately without liability
attaching, it did not have to do so without a judicial determination. 8 By
way of contrast, this same statute provided that, upon the death of a de-
positor, a P.O.D. fund vested in a surviving spouse. The minor's right to
P.O.D. funds deposited in a savings and loan association was the same
with the additional stipulation that no payment could occur until sixty
days after the death of such member.3 7 "[N]o statute in the Code [dealt]
with P.O.D. accounts in credit unions."38 Thus, the only recourse for de-
termining the right to these accounts seemed to have been the courts.
Various statutes provided a general discharge from liability for all types
of financial institutions in their payments to survivors of joint accounts.39
Sections 6.1-195.26 and 6.1-208.2 of the Code of Virginia, dealing with
joint accounts in savings and loan associations and credit unions, respec-
tively, provided that, upon the receipt of a written stop payment order by
a party to a joint account, the financial institution may have refused to
honor another party's withdrawal request pending determination of the
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601). A thorough discussion of this statute appears in Virginia Nat'l Bank
v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 257 S.E.2d 867 (1979).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.30 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979
Va. Acts, ch. 407, at 601). The sixty-day restriction does not apply to a surviving spouse
who, according to statute, is to be paid immediately.
38. Johnson, supra note 15, at 48.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-72 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601) provided payment is release for banks and trust companies.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-208.2 (Repl. Vol 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601) provided the same type of discharge from liability for credit unions.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.26 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601) granted the same protection to savings and loan associations. For a
discussion of the discrepancies in the statutory law of Virginia surrounding multiple-party
accounts, see Johnson, supra note 15, at 45-48.
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parties' rights. "[T]he financial institution [was] protected whether it
[chose] to honor the stop payment request or not. .... There [was] no
comparable section in the Virginia Code that deal[t] with this problem if
the account [was] in a bank or trust company .... ."o
The statutory law also provided for the right of set off against such
survivorship accounts in financial institutions.41
Two additional statutes dealt with the rights of parties to joint ac-
counts during their lifetimes.42 Section 6.1-73 provided that, in the ab-
sence of any specific order of the court involved, the interest of the par-
ties was transformed to a tenancy in common upon the delivery of a
certified copy of a divorce decree to a bank.43 Section 6.1-195.26 provided
that, when two or more persons opened an account in a savings and loan
association that provided for withdrawals to be made by either or the
survivor, the savings account vested in those persons as joint tenants. No
such language appeared in statutes concerning banks or credit unions.
Absent case law interpretation and the legislative history of this section,
the meaning of the statute is unclear. However, it is believed no true joint
tenancy was intended on account of the resultant gift tax exposure.44
This discussion of Virginia's statutory provisions concerning multiple-
party accounts prior to July 1, 1980 demonstrates clearly that confusing
and conflicting results emanated from these provisions and their omis-
sions. The injustice of a network of statutes which treated persons hold-
ing the same joint account device differently based on "the character of
the financial institution in which the deposit is made, rather than the
40. Johnson, supra note 40, at 55 n.81. See also Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 10-
20.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-206 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (pertaining to credit unions); VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-195.26 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 407,
at 601 (pertaining to savings and loan associations). While no statute creates such a right for
banks, case law has so provided. See Reserve Bank v. State Bank, 150 Va. 423, 143 S.E. 697
(1928).
42. Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 10.
43. A companion statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provides:
Upon the entry of a decree of divorce ... all contingent rights of either consort in
the real and personal property of the other ... including the right of survivorship in
real or personal property title to which is vested in the parties as joint tenants...
shall be extinguished, and such estate by the entirety shall thereupon be converted
into a tenancy in common. (emphasis added)
44. For a discussion of joint tenancy and gift tax, see notes 97-98 infra and accompanying
[Vol. 14:851
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character of the deposit itself"45 is glaring.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS ACT
With an awareness of the quagmire of judicial decisions and statutory
provisions concerning multiple-party accounts and their failure to match
depositor expectations or to provide certainty and unanimity of result,
the General Assembly recently enacted a new statute to govern this
area.
46
Generally, the structure of Virginia's Multiple-Party Accounts Statute
follows article six of the Uniform Probate Code.47 The first section" con-
tains definitions which apply throughout. Financial institutions are de-
fined so as to include "banks and trust companies, savings banks, build-
ing and loan associations, savings and loan companies or associations, and
credit unions.' 9 This definition should eliminate the injustice of identical
account devices being treated by the courts in as many as three ways
upon the death of the depositor dependent upon the nature of the
financial institution involved. 0 These statutory definitions are new to
Virginia law but in no way conflict with prior law.51
Section 6.1-125.2 identifies and states the purpose of the sections to
follow. It provides that sections 6.1-125.3 through 6.1-125.5 are relevant
only as to disputes between parties to the accounts and their creditors
and successors. On the other hand, the provisions of sections 6.1-125.9
through 6.1-125.14 "govern the liability of financial institutions who make
payments pursuant"52 to signature card contracts. There is no cross appli-
cation between these two groups. "Hence a financial institution may be
protected in making payments ... but the parties to the account may
45. Johnson, supra note 15, at 47.
46. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -.6 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
47. 8 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 99 (Supp. 1980) shows that fourteen states have adopted
the UPC in whole or part. Eleven have adopted chapter VI of the UPC on multiple-party
accounts. Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005 to .36.100 (1972 & Supp. 1978); Arizona, ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to -7307 (Supp. 1979-80); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-10-
101 to -17-101 (1973 & Supp. 1979); Hawaii, HAwAI REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-101 to :8-101 (Repl.
Vol. 1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §8 15-1-101 to -7-401 (1979 & Supp. 1980); Maine, Ma. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 1-101 to 8-401 (1979); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to
.8-103 (West 1975); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (1979); New Mexico.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to -7-401 (1978); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §8 30.1-01-
01 to -35-01 (1976); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -8-101 (1978).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1(3) (Repl. Vol. 1979).
50. Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 3.
51. Id. at 7-8.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.2 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
still litigate between themselves the ownership of the funds paid out."5
Previously, no provision comparable to section 6.1-125.2 existed in Vir-
ginia law. However, "[flt is believed that sections 6.1-72 and 6.1-208.2 re-
lated [solely] to the [protection of] the financial institution; that sections
6.1-73, 6.1-73.1, [and] 6.1-195.23 . . . [dealt] with the relationship be-
tween parties to multiple-party accounts; and that sections 6.1-77, 6.1-
195.26, 6.1-195.30, and 6.1-207 [dealt] with both relationships."
Under the Multiple-Party Accounts Act, the form of the account con-
clusively determines the liability of the financial institutions for payment
on accounts.55 Thus, certainty of result in a volume business is created
and maintained. Although similar protection statutes already existed in
Virginia," there was no uniformity in the protection afforded.57
It should be noted that under the Uniform Probate Code, the financial
institution is not protected if payments are made after written stop pay-
ment notice is given by any party able to request present withdrawals."
Identical language is found in section 6.1-125.13. The Virginia provision
then goes on to add that "should any party ... notify the financial insti-
tution in writing not to permit withdrawals by any party, the financial
institution may refuse, without liability, to allow any withdrawal pending
the determination of the rights of the parties." 59 Such language appeared
in earlier statutes dealing with credit unions 9 and savings and loan as-
sociations.61 It will now also apply to banks. This provision gives the bank
the discretionary power to refuse payment to all parties to the account.
While the parties to a joint account dispute their rights, this statutory
language has the beneficial effect of insulating the account from raids by
any party.
In contrast to the financial institution protection provisions where form
controls, the sections dealing with the relationship between persons
53. R. EFFLAND, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 253 (1972).
54. Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 9.
55. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-125.9 to -125.14. See also R. EFFLAND, UNIFORM PROBATE
PRACTICE MANUAL 257-59 (1972).
56. See notes 39-40 & 52 supra and accompanying text.
57. For instance, the statutory sections pertaining to Totten trust accounts are not cast in
"protection" terminology. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See also Virginia Com-
ments, supra note 6, at 25-26, which lists and discusses various financial protection statutes
prior to July 1, 1980.
58. UPC § 6-112.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.13 (Repi. Vol. 1979) (emphasis added).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-208.2 (Repl. Vol. 1979). See Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at
26.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.26 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
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named in the accounts create presumptions but permit inquiry into the
intent apart from form.62 Sections 6.1-125.3 to 6.1-125.5 have the most
significant impact in terms of clarifying prior Virginia law.
Sections 6.1-125.3 and 6.1-125.4 apply to ownership rights during the
lifetime of the persons named. The former is a general statement of such
rights in joint accounts. The latter section affects rights upon divorce.
Section 6.1-125.3 reflects the assumption that a person who deposits funds
in a multiple-party account normally does not intend to make an irrevo-
cable gift of all or any part of the funds represented by the deposit ....
The theory of [this] section is that the basic relationship of the parties [dur-
ing their lifetimes] is that of individual ownership of values attributable to
their respective deposits and withdrawals .... 63
Thus, in the case of a joint account or Totten trust, ownership during
lifetime, is, in effect, based upon the net contributions of the parties to
the account unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent."
Purposefully, no provision is made for the situation where net contribu-
tions cannot be determined in order to avoid any possible gift tax impli-
cations. However, it is believed the division would be in equal shares. 65
This section on lifetime ownership rights parallels the UPCB and, even
though prior law in this area has been less than precise, it seemingly codi-
fies preceding law in Virginia. The case law concerning lifetime interests
was nonexistent. Virginia cases pertaining to multiple-party accounts had
dealt exclusively with survivorship rights, not lifetime rights, in the funds
of such accounts.67 On the statutory side, section 6.1-195.26 "provide[d]
that when two or more persons open an account in a savings and loan
association that provides for withdrawals to be made by either or the sur-
vivor, '... such savings account shall be vested in such persons as joint
tenants.... "8 No case law interpreted this statute before its repeal.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that the creation of a joint bank ac-
count results in a legal joint tenancy." Such a joint tenancy is statutory
62. See R. EFFLAND, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 252 (1972).
63. Official Comment to UPC § 6-103.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-126.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1979) (joint accounts); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
125.3(C) (Repl. Vol. 1979) (Totten trusts). Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3(B) (Repl. Vol.
1979) (P.O.D. accounts belong conclusively to the original payee (depositor)).
65. Official Comment to UPC § 6-103.
66. UPC § 6-103.
67. See notes 16-17 supra.
68. Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 10 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Ison v. Ison, 410 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); 5A N.Y. JuR. REv. Banks & Trust
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in nature; therefore, the lack of the four common law unities of interest,
title, time and possession is not determinative.7 0 However, as evidenced at
hearings before the House Committee on Banking and in studies by the
Division of Legislative Services, it was determined that in Virginia no
true joint tenancy was created by this section.71 The determination rested
primarily upon the federal gift tax implications of a true joint tenancy.72
The legal consequence of such a tenancy would have been "a present
transfer of a one-half interest in the account to each joint tenant '1 3 and
gift tax exposure for the depositor.7 4 For this reason, the present section
clarifies, as well as reflects, prior statutory law.75
It is noted, nonetheless, that, as between spouses, the net contribution
concept of section 6.1-125.3 may not meet depositor expectations. Addi-
tionally, while there is no track record in the realm of lifetime rights,
prior statutory and case law on survivorship rights differentiated between
accounts where the parties were spouses vis a vis accounts where the par-
ties were not husband and wife.76 These considerations suggest the need
for further legislative study of lifetime rights in such accounts and, more
generally, for legislative study in the area of spousal rights to all forms of
property.
It is contended, moreover, that the option of a gift or true joint tenancy
upon "clear and convincing evidence of intent" would become more of a
reality via an amendment to section 6.1-125.15 of the Virginia Code. Such
an amendment could require financial institutions to offer a third "form"
Companies § 281 (1975) (which establishes a rebuttable statutory joint tenancy during life).
70. Note, Property Owned with Spouse: Joint Tenancy, Tenancy by the Entireties and
Community Property, 11 RE.AL PROP., PROS. & TR. J. 405, 406 (1976).
71. DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES STUDY reported in letter from C. William Cramme
to Delegate Mary Sue Terry (May 14, 1979).
72. Id. at 4-5. See also Virginia Comments, supra note 6, at 10.
73. Panel Discussion, Joint Property: Its Virtues and Vices, 111 Ta. & EST. 446, 449
(1972) (remarks by the Hon. Nathan R. Sobel).
74. Presently, where the depositing party to a joint account has the right to withdraw the
whole fund without the consent of the other party, there is no gift tax. The transfer is
deemed incomplete. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1979). With a true joint tenancy there
would be no right to withdraw the whole without accounting since each party owns an undi-
vided one-half and there would be an immediate gift by the depositor of one-half. Panel
Discussion, supra note 73, at 453 (remarks by Jerome A. Manning).
75. See generally Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy,
54 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1970) commenting that in some instances legislatures have treated
the joint account as a distinct species of property ownership without intending a true joint
tenancy to result.
76. Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960); King v. Merryman, 196 Va.
844, 86 S.E.2d 741 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July
1, 1980 by Va. Acts, ch. 407, at 601).
[Vol. 14:851
19801 MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS 863
alternative: JOINT ACCOUNT - PRESENT GIFT OF A ONE-HALF INTEREST -
SURVIVORSHIP. It is asserted that this new language would suffice as clear
and convincing evidence of an intent for ownerhip in life in proportions
other than net contributions of the parties as required by section 6.1-
125.3.77
Section 6.1-125.4, a companion section, provides lifetime ownership
rights upon entry of a decree of divorce. As presently enacted, it too pro-
vides for ownership based on net contribution. At first glance, this section
appears to accurately reflect prior Virginia law which stated that, upon
entry of a decree of divorce, parties interested in joint accounts in a bank
or trust account were to be treated as tenants in common.78 Although a
tenancy in common presumptively creates equal undivided interests in
the transferees, the presumption can be rebutted by showing unequal
contributions.79 Therefore, the net contribution concept would follow.
Nonetheless, it is also possible that section 6.1-73 when considered in
light of section 20-11180 in the divorce law was designed to provide equal
shares upon divorce.81
An amendment was proposed to the 1980 General Assembly advocating
the "equal share" approach as well as granting flexibility to the court in
setting the date of extinguishment and conversion into equal shares. 82
Such an amendment would give recognition to the contribution of the
77. Such an amendment might operate similarly to the gift election option with real prop-
erty of I.R.C. § 2515(c).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1980 by 1979 Va.
Acts, ch. 407, at 601).
79. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 224 n.3 (1962).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provides:
Upon the entry of a decree of divorce ... all contingent rights of either consort in
the real and personal property of the other then existing. . ., including the right of
survivorship in real or personal property title to which is vested in the parties as joint
tenants or as tenants by the entirety, with survivorship as at common law, shall be
extinguished, and ... converted into a tenancy in common.
81. In Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E.2d 17 (1958), the court held that despite the
wife's greater contribution to the jointly-owned property, only equal shares could be allotted
under § 20-111. This case speaks in terms of gift and the statute refers to title vesting as
joint tenants. Of course, if the joint account is not deemed a true joint tenancy and no gift
occurs, § 20-111 would not apply to joint accounts. Such a conclusion does not bar the
possibility that the legislature in § 6.1-73 intended joint accounts, notwithstanding the
property title question, to be divided equally upon divorce.
82. S.B. No. 388 Va. General Assembly (1980). For the provisions of this amendment and
its present status, see note 9 supra and accompanying text. It is suggested that wherever the
word "terminated" is utilized, the phrase "or partially depleted" should be added to prevent
parties contemplating divorce from drawing such accounts down to minimal sums without
terminating the accounts.
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non-breadwinning spouse in a marriage. In addition, no gift tax exposure
would result since section 2516 of the Internal Revenue Code has been
interpreted to mean "that transfers of property or interests in property
made under the terms of a written agreement between spouses in settle-
ment of their . . . property rights [pursuant to a divorce and where a
final decree is procured within two years after entering into the agree-
ment] are deemed to be for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth and, therefore, exempt from the gift tax. . . 2 "3 Fur-
thermore, the flexibility afforded the court in setting the date of extin-
guishment and conversion into equal shares will discourage the race to
the bank by parties in the divorce situation.
Aside from establishing rights during life, the Multiple-Party Accounts
Act settles the issue of survivorship rights by declaring that the sums re-
maining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account presump-
tively belong to the surviving party as against the claims of the estate of
the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent." As discussed previously, prior case law in Virginia provided a
variety of results as to survivorship rights.85 There was a presumption of
convenience which, in fact, more often than not, denied survivorship.8 6
Thie clarity that this new section on survivorship brings to joint accounts
and its recognition of depositors' expectations that the incident of survi-
vorship presumptively attaches8 7 produces a positive and valuable base
upon which Virginia's Multiple-Party Account law may rest.
The last two sections of Virginia's Multiple-Party Accounts Act merit
attention. Neither appears in section VI of the UPC.
Section 6.1-125.15 states that forms for the creation of joint accounts
are to be clearly labeled as "JOINT AcCOUNT WITH SURVIVORSHIP" and
"JOINT ACCOUNT - No SURVIVORSH'." ' 8 This provision has the positive
effect of giving the depositors a clear election as to the right of survivor-
ship and alerts the depositor to the consequences of opening such an ac-
count.819 The clause declaring that this section is not applicable to joint
accounts created before July 1, 1980 seems unnecessary. Notices to all old
account holders and the issuance of new signature cards would help to
83. Treas. Reg. § 25.2516.1 (1979).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
85. See notes 16, 17, 21 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 20 supra.
87. See note 28 supra for the results of a Virginia survey on depositor expectations.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15 (Repl. Vol. 1979).




assure that the form of the joint account matched the depositor's inten-
tion without unreasonably burdening the financial institution. Since the
law is currently in effect, an amendment would be required to affect this
result.
Section 6.1-125.16 fixes the effective date for the new act. It provides
that the new act is applicable to all facets of existing multiple-party ac-
counts except for the inter-parties aspect of joint accounts between per-
sons not married to each other in accounts created prior to July 1, 1980.
This section creates a grandfather clause which has already caused confu-
sion as to its applicability.90 Again an amendment could remedy this situ-
ation providing a delayed effective date so that the financial institutions
could get notice to their customers on the need to review accounts be-
cause of new legislation.
III. CONCLUSION
The new Virginia law on multiple-party accounts establishes an excel-
lent system of uniform rules for joint, pay-on-death and trust accounts in
various financial institutions. It for the most part has adopted the recom-
mendations of the Uniform Probate Code, section VI on Multiple-Party
Accounts.
The section on survivorship rights took a muddle of prior case law and
statutes and created a single rule of a rebuttable presumption of survivor-
ship which clearly mirrors the expectations of most depositors. Likewise,
the statute affords the financial institutions protection for payments
made according to the form provided in every case.
The section on lifetime rights between parties to joint accounts pro-
vides certainty in its concept of "net contributions" as determinative of
ownership in life. In addition, a reasonable interpretation of depositors'
expectations includes the theory that the basic relationship of the parties
to multiple-party accounts is that of individual ownership equivalent to
net deposits, a right of withdrawal for the depositor to the extent of his
ownership without accounting, a right of withdrawal for the non-deposi-
tor as agent for contributor and the right of survivorship at death of the
owner. This viewpoint recognizes and holds to the testamentary character
of joint and survivor accounts.
90. Thurston v. Maggard, - Va. _, 263 S.E.2d 64, 66 n.* (1980). This note expresses the
view that the presumption of convenience has been abolished by VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5
(Repi. Vol. 1979). But, in fact, as to accounts prior to July 1, 1980, it has not been abolished
as to interparty disputes (versus disputes with the financial institution) between persons
not married to each other. See also Official Comment to UPC § 6-104.
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
However, this view provides no recognition of the special husband-wife
relationship or of the non-economic contributions inherent in the hus-
band-wife relationship. It is also doubtful whether, as between husband
and wife, the "net contribution" concept reflects depositors' expectations.
These factors illustrate forcefully the need for legislative study and action
in the sphere of spousal property rights.
In addition, passage of Senate Bill No. 388 as an amendment to section
6.1-125.4 addressing the effect of divorce on joint accounts is recom-
mended.91 Such a bill, if enacted, would provide for joint accounts to be
converted into equal shares upon divorce. It would also grant the court
flexibility in setting the date upon which the account would be converted
into equal shares. It is asserted that such a bill would have the favorable
effects of recognizing the contribution to the family or partnership of the
non-wage earning spouse without gift tax consequences and would dis-
courage the race to the bank by parties contemplating divorce.
The code section providing for clear labeling of accounts "survivor-
ship"-"no survivorship 92 is a good addition to Virginia law for it helps to
educate the depositor on the meaning of the creation of joint accounts
and gives him the opportunity to make an election. However, this section,
should be amended to create a third form providing for a joint-tenancy-
gift account. Such a form would provide the clear and convincing intent
required by the statute for lifetime ownership rights in a joint account
which are not intended to be in proportion to net contribution.
Although not without areas in need of modification and study, the new
Multiple-Party Accounts Act in Virginia shows a welcome progression
from judicial attempts to identify the joint account by traditional com-
mon law concepts of gift and contract "to recognition of the account as a
new and useful technique for transferring property which need not fit any
historical molds."95
Barbara M. Rose
91. S.B. No. 388 General Assembly (1980) addresses this problem.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
93. Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 CHI. L. REv. 376,
401 (1959).
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